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Abstract 
 
This paper is the first attempt to investigate the causal relationship between military spending, 
terrorist attacks and intensity of terrorism in Pakistan, by applying ARDL approach to 
cointegration and Innovation Accounting approach for causality analysis. The results indicate 
that war on terror is the major determinant of military spending followed by terrorism intensity 
and the number of terrorist attacks respectively. The study further finds that terrorism intensity 
and terrorist attacks Granger-cause military spending but the reverse causality is found absent. 
The failure of military measures to curtail terrorism and its intensity induces one to suggest 
greater involvement of civil intelligence agencies by raising their budgets instead of pure 
military budget. 
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1. Introduction  
The world has witnessed tremendous increase in terrorist and violent incidents of amplified 
intensities in the first decade of the new millennium. Consequently, a rich literature emerged on 
the causes and consequences of terrorism. Although controversies still exist on the determinants 
of violence, a consensus is developed among the scholars and policy makers about the adverse 
consequences of violent incidents for the economy. As a result, anti-terrorism efforts remain high 
on the political agenda of nations all over the world. Indeed, eradicating the core causes of 
terrorism is the only sustainable solution to the problem. This, however, is a long-term process 
and relying only on this solution may be a dreadful mistake. The immediate solution, therefore, 
requires policies aimed at strengthening the security system. This paves the way for increasing 
budgets for military spending in most of the countries, and Pakistan is no exception. 
 
Majority of the terrorism and armed conflicts have been observed in low-middle-income 
countries [Gupta et al. 2004]. Of all the middle-income countries, Pakistan has suffered from 
highest number of terrorist attacks in the last few years. These attacks were intensive in terms of 
casualties as well. For instance, from summer of 2007 to late 2009, more than 5,500 people were 
killed in suicidal bomb blasts and other attacks on civilians. The attacks have been attributed to a 
number of reasons: sectarian violence - mainly between Sunni and Shia Muslims; the easy 
availability of guns such as AK-47 and spread of weapon culture; and the influx of ideologically 
driven "Afghan Arabs" based in or near Pakistan, originating from the USSR-Afghanistan war 
1980s which blew back into Pakistan.  
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After the bloodbath of 9/11, the joint attack by the US and coalition forces on Afghanistan ended 
the Taliban’s regime. The Taliban could not counter the invaders’ air-strikes and were ordered to 
be dispersed by Mulla Omer; the Taliban’s supreme commander. However, after couple of years 
the Taliban came out from their hideouts and started attacking the coalition forces in 
Afghanistan.  It was perceived that Al-Qaeda, Taliban supporters and other Islamist combative 
found safe sanctuary in the rugged Pakistan-Afghanistan border region, forcing Pakistan to 
conduct a military operation in 2004 in Waziristan; one of the agencies in the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. This military operation together with the drone 
attacks by the US led to the emergence of what is now called Pakistani Taliban. Tahreek-e-
Taliban Pakistan (TTP), one of the most influential and dangerous groups among the Pakistan 
Taliban, declared a war initially against Pakistan Army. In retaliation to the collateral damage, 
this war spread to the rest of the FATA region. Afterward, the terrorist attacks spread in entire 
country, resulting in numerous casualties (Kronstadt, 2007). This domestic terrorism in Pakistan 
has turn out to be a serious problem distressing major Pakistani cities. There were signs of the so 
called “Talibanization” in the country which became major concern for the Government of 
Pakistan and it started taking serious actions against it. All these factors were used as rationale 
for increasing military budget to fight the so-called war on terror. Subsequently, the defense 
budget has been on the rise and even for the fiscal year 2011-12, the Parliament’s Standing 
Committee for Defense has approved an increase of 13%-18%. Such high increases in defense 
budgets are usually at the cost of developmental expenditures but are not much opposed by the 
masses assuming that they are used for curtailing terrorism. 
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In this backdrop, the study in hands aims to examine whether or not the mere increased 
allocation of resources for defense expenditure is fruitful in reducing the number of terrorist 
incidents or their intensity (or both) in the terrorism-victimized country of Pakistan. The study 
further explores the impact of war on terror, the number of terrorist incidents, and the intensity of 
these incidents on the increment in military budget. It is worth mentioning here that this study 
makes a contribution to the existent literature in the sense that it is the first attempt to incorporate 
both terrorism and its intensity simultaneously. For this purpose, both the Autoregressive 
Distributed Lag (ARDL) bounds testing approach and Innovation Accounting approach for 
causality analysis are used. 
 
Rest of the study proceeds as follows; Section 2 discusses detailed literature on the topic. The 
third Section gives theory and the subsequent econometric specification. Section 4 gives a brief 
description of data and methodology used in the analysis. Results are discussed in fifth Section, 
while Section 6 concludes the study. 
 
2. Review of Literature 
The ample and extensive literature available on conflict and terrorism can broadly be classified 
into several categories, which are one way or the other related to each other. For instance, one ilk 
of literature studies the economic cost of armed conflicts for economies [see, for example, 
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), Venieries and Gupta (1986), Barro (1991), Alesina and Perotti 
(1993, 1996), Alesina et al. (1996), Rodrik (1999), Arunatilake et al. (2001) and, Richardson and 
Samarasinghe (1991)]. Likewise, a series of literature focuses on the relationship between 
defense spending on economic growth. Nevertheless, mixed results are found regarding the 
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direction of impact. For example, Benoit (1978) concludes that the effect of defense spending on 
economic growth is positive in less developed countries. On the other hand, however, Arora and 
Bayoumi (1993) and Knight et al. (1996) find that a fall in defense spending stimulates the pace 
of economic growth. This is due to the fact that lower military spending promotes economic 
growth by the augmentation of capital formation and the upgrading of competence with which 
resources are consumed in the economy (Gupta et al. 2004). Similarly, contradictory results are 
reported in various studies conducted for specific countries. Sezgin (1997, 2001) has analyzed 
the defense spending pattern of Turkish economy from the year 1950 to 1994 and has proven the 
existence of a positive relation between defense spending and economic growth.  Conversely, in 
the case of Greece, Sezgin (2000) finds an inverse relationship between defense spending and 
economic growth.  
 
Likewise, another group in the conflict literature tries to identify the fiscal impact of counter-
terrorism actions. Some studies have also established the link between defense spending and 
economic growth as well as between economic growth and tax policy of a country. For example, 
Caroll (2006) explores that the spending for national defense directly manipulates the federal 
corporate income tax rate. Furthermore, the economic cost of counter-terrorism measures and the 
ensuing effects on the fiscal balance have also been investigated (Lis, 2007). The study confirms 
the crowding-out of productive investment due to security issues and the resultant increase in 
defense spending, leading to reduction in resource availability for any other productive activity. 
Interestingly, Blomberg et al. (2004) believe that although terrorist attacks do give way to an 
increment of government spending, yet this ascend can compensate the abridged investment 
spending of the same quantity in the short run. 
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There had been a wide debate on the relationship between expenditures being done on military 
defense and level of terrorism prevailing in the country. Literature on this issue has unanimously 
concluded the fact that there is no nexus between defense expenditures and terrorism incidents. 
Theoretical stance expects to have significant decrease in terrorist activities, as defense 
expenditure increases, so that military measures can be effective in suppressing terrorism. Even 
so, the literature does not support this presumption, suggesting such futile military interventions 
may be well counterproductive. Empirical literature in this area (Brophy-Baermann and 
Conybeare, 1994; Cauley and Im, 1988 and, Enders and Sandler, 1993) has compared the 
number of terrorist attacks before and after the effectuation of counter-terrorism military 
activities, so that the impact of such policies on terrorism can be gauged. On similar lines, 
Landes (1978), Sandler (2005) and Silke (2005) has a consensus that taking vehement measures 
for controlling terrorism, ironically, instead of thwarting them, stimulate such attacks.  
 
Likewise, Omand (2005) alleges that the absence of comprehensive long-term strategy for 
combating terrorism at international level impedes such attempts nationally. In case of United 
States, Lum et al. (2006) refute the effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures, concluding that 
such measures tend to provoke terrorism further. Moreover, in case of Turkey, Feridun and 
Shahbaz (2010) find, conversely, a uni-direction causality running from terrorist attacks to 
defense spending. 
 
For this reason, it can be asseverate that existing literature denies the role of military measures in 
ebbing terrorism. However, the entire literature on the linkage between terrorism and military 
spending concentrates merely on terrorism and not on its intensity. Even the uni-directional 
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causality from terrorism to military spending needs to be reassessed by modeling together the 
three variables namely, terrorism, intensity of terrorism and military spending. With this milieu, 
the present article intents to enrich the available literature by not only assessing the effectiveness 
of military measures in deterring terrorism in Pakistan, but also by evaluating the distinct effects 
of terrorism and its intensity on defense spending. 
 
3. Theory and Econometric Specification 
This section discusses the theoretical foundations linking military spending, terrorism and 
intensity of terrorism. However, before these channels are explained, it would be expedient if 
terrorism and the intensity of terrorism are discussed and distinguished. Terrorism is simply the 
number of terrorist incidents occurred during a particular period. On the other hand, terrorism 
intensity is measured by the number of casualties, inclusive of both deaths and injuries, occurred 
as a consequence of a particular terrorist attack. In this regard, firstly, the possible channels 
through which terrorism or its intensity affect defense spending are explored. Next, the 
theoretical possibilities of the impacts of military spending on terrorism are discussed. Finally, 
the estimable econometric specification is formulated in the light of these theoretical 
considerations.  
 
It is now an established fact, with empirical support, that an upsurge in terrorist incidents leads to 
higher expenditures on defense. The reason for this positive association is the common belief 
that increment in military spending is the most effective and in fact the only possible measure 
that could be taken for combating terrorism. People look up to the military forces as their only 
saviors and this provides grounds to ask for more military budget. It is believed, at least 
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theoretically, that higher the number of terrorist attacks, the easier it will be to gain public 
support to convince the policy makers to allocate more resources to defense expenditures. 
Therefore, with this perspective, there is expected to be a positive relation between terrorist 
incidents and military spending. 
 
As mentioned earlier, this study is the first and foremost attempt to incorporate the intensity of 
terrorism as a separate variable in the estimation of relationship between terrorism and defense 
spending. We believe, based on our experiences and interactions with people in Pakistan, that it 
is not only the number of terrorist attacks but also their intensities which are crucial to spur on 
military expenditures. For example, several blasts with less human damages may not be 
equivalent in spreading terror to a single blast engulfing hundreds of human lives. Especially in 
Pakistan, a terrorist attack which is unsuccessful in terms of casualties is no more a paramount 
news. People have become used to such news. Nonetheless, attacks taking human lives do have 
detrimental psychological effects and spread fear among the masses. It is this fear of the intensity 
of terrorism which instigates the demand for security from the masses and so empowers the 
policy makers to enhance defense budget. For these reasons, one can expect positive impact of 
terrorism intensity on military expenditures. 
 
Next we assess the linkage between military spending and terrorism, treating latter as a 
dependant variable. It is already notified in previous section that most of the empirical literature 
rejects causality running from military spending to terrorism. However, based on theoretical 
assertions, it is expected that a rise in defense spending must lead to a lessening of terrorist 
activities believing that military measures are effective in combating terrorism. Nevertheless, as 
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brought into light by some studies mentioned above, it is also important to note that counter-
terrorism measures may also be counter-productive and may spark up terrorism as its 
repercussion.  Furthermore, there can be another indirect channel as well, at least theoretically, 
through which rise in military spending may dilate terrorism. If in a country, the economic 
conditions do play a role in terrorism, then diverting resources to military spending will leave 
little in the budget to spend on ameliorating the economic environment of the “haves-not”. In 
fact, such diversion may worsen their situation. Hence, one may expect both positive and 
negative impact of military spending on terrorism; both in terms of attacks and intensity. 
 
As, we are interested in investigating the effect of terrorism and its intensity on military 
expenditure, thus, in the light of above discussion, primarily the following econometric 
specification will be estimated: 
)1(lnlnln 210 tttt TITAM    
Where tMln  represents the natural log of military spending, tTAln is the natural log of terrorist 
incidents, tTIln  is the natural log of intensity of terrorism and t  is regression error term1. 
1 and 2  are the two coefficients and, based on theoretical considerations, there signs are 
expected to be positive. 
4. Methodology and Data 
4.1 Methodology 
This study explores the relationship among military spending, terrorism and intensity of 
terrorism. The use of time series data for analysis calls for testing of stationarity of all the 
                                                            
1 See Shahbaz (2010) for justification of log-linear specification. 
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variables. This is a critical prerequisite to circumvent the problem of spurious regression. If the 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression is applied to non-stationary variables used in level form, 
the coefficients obtained as a result will be meaningless. Nonetheless, several procedure are 
available to explore cointegration in non-stationary series; Engle–Granger’s (1987); two-step 
Johansen’s (1992) maximum likelihood; Pesaran–Shin’s (1999) and Pesaran et al. (2001) 
Autoregressive Distributive Lag (ARDL) models. Engle–Granger’s approach does not offer the 
best choice if more than one cointegrating vector is present (Seddighi et al. 2006). However, 
between the Johansen’s (1992) maximum likelihood method and the Pesaran et al. (2001) ARDL 
method to cointegration, the latter is preferred for three obvious reasons; first, this approach can 
be applied irrespective of whether the variables are I(0) and I(1); second, the small sample 
properties of the ARDL approach are far superior to that of the Johansen and Juselius’s 
cointegration technique (Pesaran and Shin, 1999). Thirdly, ARDL model helps to derive 
dynamic error correction model through a simple linear transformation without losing 
information about long span of time. The error correction model integrates the short-run 
dynamics with the long-run equilibrium without losing information about long-run.  
 
The ARDL bounds testing approach to cointegration involves estimating the unrestricted error 
correction method (UECM) of the ARDL model as follows:  
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The 1 ,  1  and  1 are drift components and i  is assumed to be white noise residual term. The 
akaike information criterion (AIC) is used to select the optimal lag structure to make sure that 
serial correlation does not exist. Pesaran et al. (2001) tabulated lower critical bound (LCB) and 
upper critical bound (UCB) to take decision whether long run relation between the variables 
exists or not. The null hypotheses of no cointegration are 0:0  TATIMH  , 
0:0  TATIMH  and 0:0  TATIMH   while hypotheses of cointegration are 
0:  TATIMaH  , 0:  TATIMaH  and 0:  TATIMaH  . The next turn is 
to compare the calculated F-statistic with critical bounds by Turner (2006) to analyze whether 
cointegration relation exists or not. If upper critical bound is less than computed F-statistic then 
decision is in favor of cointegration i.e. long run relationship exists. There is no cointegration 
between the variables if calculated F-statistic is lower than lower critical bound (LCB). If 
calculated F-statistic lies between lower and upper critical bounds then decision about 
cointegration is inconclusive. 
  
After the long-run relationship among the variables is established and the long-run estimates are 
obtained, the next objective is to conduct causality analysis. For this purpose, we use the 
Innovation Accounting approach2. This approach consists of variance decompositions and 
impulse response functions. The variance decomposition allows us to detect the contribution of 
                                                            
2 It is argued in economics literature that the Granger causality approaches such VECM Granger causality test has 
some limitations. The causality test cannot capture the relative strength of causal relation between the variable 
beyond the selected time period. This weakens the reliability of causality results by VECM Granger approach 
(Wolde-Rufael, 2009). 
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each variable in the variation occurred in a particular variable. If a variable explains significant 
variation in another variable, it will imply that the first variable causes the other. The impulse 
response functions, on the other hand, represent the response of one variable to shocks in others. 
This is also helpful in demonstrating the direction of effect generated by the shocks.   
 
4.2 Data 
This underlying study uses four variables for analysis, namely, terrorism, intensity of terrorism, 
military spending and a dummy for war on terror period. The overall period of analysis is from 
1974 to 2010. Several studies in the conflict literature used number of terrorist incidents as 
measure of terrorism (see, for instance, Nasir et al. 2011) whereas some made use of the number 
of fatalities as proxy for terrorism (Feridun and Shahbaz, 2010). Assuming that both these 
measure have different degree of psychological impact, the present article brings into play both 
these proxies as two different variables. Consequently, in this analysis, the number of terrorist 
attacks occurred in a particular year is used as a measure of terrorism. On the other hand, the 
number of causalities in these attacks is a proxy for intensity of terrorism. Data for both these 
variables have been taken from South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). 
 
Data on military spending is obtained from the Pakistan Economic Survey (2010). As rightly 
discussed in Feridun and Shahbaz (2010), the results obtained by using the overall defense 
spending data should be interpreted with care as there might exists some degree of measurement 
error. Unfortunately, for unrevealed reasons, the separate data on expenditures used for counter-
terrorism measures is not made public. Therefore, data on overall military spending remain the 
only option to be used in the analysis. 
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After Afghanistan, Pakistan is the second country that faced the drastic consequences of the 9/11 
event, in shape of terrorism. Being neighbor to Afghanistan became a curse for Pakistan as 
Taliban allegedly found hideouts in the bordering tribal areas of Pakistan after US attack on 
Afghanistan. At US insistence, the Pakistan Army launched an operation in the tribal areas 
resulting in huge collateral damage. In response, the terrorists started terrorist attacks of high 
intensities in the settled areas of Pakistan killing more than an estimated 32000 thousand people 
and injuring more than this number. Consequently, military budget also started rising. The 
estimated loss to the economy is more than 69 billion dollars [Pakistan Economic Survey, 2011]. 
Hence, in order to investigate whether the war on terror has any effect on Pakistan’s military 
expenditure, a dummy variable is used in the analysis. It takes the value “1” for the years from 
2002 to 2010, and “0” for the rest of the years. Table 1 illustrates the descriptive statistics for 
these variables. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
Variables tMln  tTAln  tTIln  
Mean 6.2216 5.1746 3.4556 
Median 6.5030 5.9989 3.6375 
Maximum 7.4642 8.4053 6.8090 
Minimum 4.2328 0.0000 0.0000 
Std. Dev. 0.9609 2.4204 1.9346 
Skewness -0.5555 -0.7832 -0.1312 
Kurtosis 2.0714 2.4908 1.9486 
Jarque-Bera 3.2321 4.1827 1.8104 
Probability 0.1986 0.123518 0.4044 
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 5. Estimation Results and Discussion 
Although the ARDL approach to cointegration is applicable irrespective of whether the variables 
are integrated of order zero or one, still pre-testing for non stationarity is worthwhile for the 
reason that the presence of a variable(s) with I(2) or higher can complicate the F-test, making the 
results unreliable (Ouattara, 2004). As a result, following Dickey and Fuller (1979) and Elliott et 
al. (1996), the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and the modified Dickey-Fuller t-test (DF-
GLS) are conducted in order to identify the order of integration of the variables. It is perceptible 
from the Table 2 that all the variables have unit root problem at level but are stationary at first 
difference. Hence, both tests confirmed that all the series are integrated of order one. 
 
Table 2: The Results of Unit Toot Tests 
Variables ADF DF-GLS 
tMln  –0.8257 (1) –0.9169 (1) 
tMln  –3.7106 (1)** –3.4800 (1)*** 
tTAln  -1.9934 (3) -1.9406 (2) 
tTAln  -5.1377(2)*** -4.8378 (2)*** 
tTIln  –1.8814 (1) –1.9587 (1) 
tTIln  –4.3601 (1)*** –4.1140 (2)*** 
Note: The *** and ** denote significance at 1% and 5% level of significance respectively. The figures in the 
parenthesis are the optimal lags for ADF and DF-GLS tests. 
 
It was argued by Baum (2004) that ADF and DF-GLS unit root tests provide biased and 
inconsistent results when a structural break point occurred in the economic series such as 
terrorist attacks in our case. After 9/11, there was a major shift in terrorist attacks and, therefore, 
in military expenditure in Pakistan due war on terror. To solve this issue, we have applied Zivot-
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Andrews (1996) unit root test that allows the structural break information at one point of time. The 
results are reported Table-3. It can be concluded from unit root analysis that the variables are not 
stationary in level form but integrated in first difference. This implies that variables have unique 
order of integration which leads us to use ARDL bounds testing approach to cointegration for 
long run relationship between the variables. 
 
Table 3: Zivot-Andrews Unit Root Analysis 
Variable 
Z-A at Level Z-A at 1st Difference 
T-statistic TB Decision T-statistic TB Decision 
tMln  -3.120 (3) 1990 I(0) -7.068 (3)*** 2004 I(1) 
tTAln  -4.093 (4) 1986 I(0) -7.453 (3)*** 1989 I(1) 
tTIln  -4.518 (4) 1998 I(0) -8.399 (3)*** 1996 I(1) 
Note: *** indicates significance at 1% level of significance. 
 
Once the order of integration of variables is identified, the next step is to investigate whether or 
not, there is a long-run relationship among these variables. Nonetheless, before proceeding to 
testing of cointegration, an important step is to select the optimal lag length of the variables. 
Conventional methods are used for this purpose. According to these criteria, the optimal lag 
length is three. After the lag length is selected, the ARDL bound testing approach to 
cointegration is applied to investigate the long-run relationship among the variables. Table 4 
reports the results of this test. 
Table 4: ARDL Bounds Testing to Cointegration Analysis 
Bounds Testing to Cointegration 
Estimated Model ),( ttt TITAfM   ),( ttt TIMfTA   ),( ttt TAMfTI   
Optimal Lag Length (3, 3, 3) (3, 2, 2) (2,3, 3) 
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F-statistics 6.763** 6.117*** 7.946** 
 Critical values (T = 36) 
Lower bounds I(0) Upper bounds I(1)  
1 per cent level 7.527 8.803  
5 per cent level 5.387 6.437  
10 percent level 4.447 5.420  
Diagnostic tests 
2R  0.8626 0.8618 0.7883 
F-statistics 2.746 (0.0899) 6.2829 (0.0003) 3.6165 (0.0115) 
J-B Normality test 2.3582 (0.3075) 1.6706 (0.4337) 1.3195 (0.5169) 
Breusch-Godfrey Test  0.1599 (0.6968) 0.0282 (0.9723) 0.9826 (0.3366) 
ARCH LM Test  0.3500 (0.5592) 0.0738 (0.7879) 0.8313 (0.3702) 
Ramsey Reset Test 0.2456 (0.7866) 0.7127 (0.7406) 1.4069 (0.2825) 
Note: The *** and ** denote the significant at 1% and 5% levels of significance respectively. The optimal lag 
structure is determined by AIC.  
  
As it is evident from the table, all the three equations are tested keeping each variable as 
dependant variable respectively. The respective lag length of dependant and explanatory 
variables in each equation are also reported in Table 4 below each equation. The results suggest 
that the null hypothesis of no long-run relationship between the variables is rejected at 5% and 
10 per cent levels respectively when military spending, terrorist attacks and terrorism intensity 
are treated as response variables. The calculated F-statistics are 6.763, 6.117 and 7.946 while the 
value of upper bound is 6.437 and 5.420 at 5 and 10 per cent level of significance. This indicates 
three cointegrating vectors among military spending, terrorist attacks and intensity of terrorism 
over the study period of 1974-2010 in case of Pakistan. The reason for using the critical bounds 
generated by Turner (2006) is that they are better suited to small samples as compared to Pesaran 
et al. (2001) and Narayan (2005).  
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It may be noted that presence of structural break in the time series makes long run relations 
residual based less powerful and unreliable. In our study, we may consider the event of 9/11 as a 
structural break for the reason that Pakistan has observed a sharp increase in terrorist attacks 
afterwards. Consequently, we may also encounter the problem mentioned above. To deal with 
this deficiency of ARDL bounds testing approach to cointegration, we have applied Gregory-
Hansen (1996) structural break cointegration test to examine the robustness of long run 
relationship between the three variables. The Gregory-Hansen cointegration test is superior over 
the residual based cointegration tests in the sense that it allows the presence of one structural 
break in the series. The results of this test are reported in Table 5.  
 
Table 5: Gregory-Hansen Structural Break Cointegration Test 
Model ),/( TATIMTM  ),/( TIMTATTA  ),/( TAMTITTI  
ADF-Test -3.687 -5.833*** -3.745 
Prob. values 0.0005 0.0000 0.0004 
Note: *** shows significance at the 1% level. The ADF statistics show the Gregory-Hansen tests of cointegration 
with an endogenous break in the intercept. Critical values for the ADF test at 1%, 5% and 10% are -5.13, -4.61 and -
4.34 respectively. 
 
According to these results, in case of terrorist attacks being dependent variable, cointegration 
prevails between military spending, terrorist attacks and terrorism intensity even after allowing 
for structural break in 2001. These results are obtained by employing the fully modified ordinary 
least square (FMOLS) approach. This outcome indicates the statistical significance of dummy 
variable for structural break in the terrorist attacks series3. After confirming the existence of 
                                                            
3 The OLS regression results are available from authors upon request. We have used dummy i.e. 1after  2001 and 0 
for the rest of the years. 
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cointegration among these variables, equation 1 has been estimated using ARDL cointegration 
methodology to get the long-run estimates. These results are reported in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: Long Run Results 
Dependent Variable = tMln  
Variable  Coefficient T-Statistic  Coefficient T-Statistic  
Constant 4.5538*** 25.5548 4.6721*** 31.7644 
tTAln  0.1847*** 3.0708 0.1346** 2.6832 
tTIln  0.2212*** 2.9586 0.2145*** 3.5385 
Dum --- --- 0.6118*** 4.2684 
Diagnostic Tests 
SquaredR   0.7986  0.8716  
StatisticsF   65.4434 0.0000 72.4674 0.0000 
NORMAL2  2.1561  0.3402 2.2800 0.2463 
ARCH2  0.1476  0.3486 0.4060 0.5283 
WHITE2  2.2342  0.0880 2.5659 0.0478 
REMSAY2  0.2321  0.5661 2.1654 0.1135 
Note: NORMAL2 refers to the Jarque–Bera statistic of the test for normal residuals, SERIAL2 is the Breusch–
Godfrey LM test statistic for serial correlation, and ARCH2 is the Engle’s test statistic for autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity, and REMSAY2  is model specification test. *** and ** represent significance at 1% and 5% 
levels. 
 
Table 6 demonstrates the results of two models. In the first model, we have included only 
military expenditures, terrorism and its intensity. The second model is a variant of the first model 
in the sense that it also includes the dummy variable to capture the effect of war on terror on 
military spending. It is obvious from results of the two models that both terrorist attacks and the 
intensity of terrorism play an important role in expanding military expenditures in Pakistan. 
However, as is evident from the table, the coefficient of terrorism intensity is greater than 
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terrorist attacks in both the models. This portrays the fact that, in the long-run, intensity of 
terrorism is more critical factor that contributes to growth of military expenditures. Furthermore, 
the significance of war on terror variable in the second model confirms the notion that military 
expenditure has increased tremendously during this period. Interestingly, with higher coefficient 
value than the other two variables, war on terror emerges as the most vital determinant of 
defense spending. In fact, the war on terror has been the major argument presented by the 
government for increased defense budget since 2002. The reason is that Pakistan, being a 
frontline ally in the war on terror, has suffered from violent assaults by Taliban. With the passage 
of time, the terrorist spread from tribal regions to settled areas. This required army to enhance its 
capacity to fight the insurgents, thereby increasing defense budget. The diagnostic tests given in 
the lower part of Table 6 confirm the validity of these results. Moreover, the estimations of two 
specifications also confirm the robustness of results. 
 
After the long-run dynamics is discussed, the next concern is to scrutinize the direction of 
causality amongst these variables. The application of ARDL bounds testing approach to 
cointegration only tests the existence of long relationship between the variable but does not 
suggest the direction of causality between them. It is documented by Morley (2006) that 
existence of long run association between the variables is necessary but not sufficient condition 
to reject the non-causality hypothesis. The empirical evidence reported in Tables 4 and 5 confirm 
the cointegration between military spending, terrorism and intensity of terrorism but it is not 
sufficient to discern the direction of causality. Nonetheless, this existence of long run 
relationship between the variables does suggest that there must be causality at least in one 
direction. These reasons necessitate the use of Innovation Accounting approach consisting of 
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variance decompositions and impulse response functions (Wolde-Rufael, 2009). The results of 
causality tests based on variance decompositions are shown in Table 7. There are three major 
blocks in the table representing the variance decomposition of each other three variables 
separately. Variance decompositions of military expenditure, terrorist attacks and intensity of 
terrorism are presented in first, second and third blocks respectively. 
 
The first block in table 7 substantiates the notion that military expenditure are caused both by 
terrorist attacks and terrorism intensity. In addition, it also illustrates that the contribution of 
terrorism intensity (22.5%) to variation in military expenditure is higher than that of terrorist 
attacks (14.5%). These results corroborate the one reported in Table 6 where terrorism intensity 
appeared to be more important determinant of military expenditures than terrorist attacks. The 
second and third blocks in Table 7 show defense spending contributes only 4% and 3.6% to 
variations in terrorism and its intensity respectively. Hence, one may say that neither terrorism 
nor its intensity is caused by military spending. These results are interesting but not surprising as 
most studies in defense literature found the same results with respect to terrorism. Lastly, both 
terrorism and its intensity cause each other as is evident from their contributions to variations in 
each other. Based on these results, we may conclude that there are unidirectional causalities 
running from terrorism and its intensity to military spending, while bidirectional causality exists 
between terrorist incidents and terrorism intensities. 
 
Table 7: Variance Decomposition Approach 
Time 
Horizons 
Variance Decomposition of tMln  Variance Decomposition of tTAln  Variance Decomposition of tTIln  
tMln  tTAln  tTIln  tMln  tTAln  tTIln  tMln  tTAln  tTIln  
 1  100.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.6597  98.3402  0.0000  0.6000  43.0349  56.3649 
 2  97.0782  2.0837  0.8380  1.1985  73.7479  25.0535  0.8021  32.4418  66.7560 
 3  86.3641  12.8070  0.8287  1.4179  71.9610  26.6209  1.3849  30.0052  68.6097 
 4  79.6557  19.2881  1.0561  2.2405  72.1640  25.5954  2.0475  34.5513  63.4011 
 5  75.3187  21.3278  3.3533  2.4376  72.6238  24.9385  2.2360  37.8223  59.9416 
 6  71.7624  21.6262  6.6113  2.6692  72.6066  24.7240  2.4168  38.4275  59.1556 
 7  68.7134  20.5883  10.6981  2.8624  71.9048  25.2327  2.5723  38.3891  59.0385 
 8  66.5629  19.2640  14.1729  3.0458  71.3885  25.5656  2.6781  37.6974  59.6244 
 9  64.9558  17.9526  17.0915  3.1880  70.7712  26.0406  2.7975  37.2741  59.9283 
 10  63.9880  16.9164  19.0955  3.3460  70.4032  26.2506  2.9174  36.9510  60.1315 
 11  63.4206  16.1041  20.4752  3.4951  70.0779  26.4269  3.0608  36.8046  60.1345 
 12  63.1691  15.5048  21.3261  3.6452  69.8858  26.4689  3.2042  36.7000  60.0956 
 13  63.0586  15.0566  21.8846  3.7837  69.7238  26.4924  3.3492  36.6291  60.0215 
 14  63.0239  14.7331  22.2429  3.9138  69.6044  26.4816  3.4824  36.5695  59.9479 
 15  62.9955  14.4911  22.5133  4.0295  69.4964  26.4740  3.6031  36.5309  59.8658 
 
  
 
 
 
 
The second technique in innovation accounting approach is impulse response functions. The 
impulse response functions given in Figure 1 validate the results of variance decompositions 
given in Table 7. It is obvious from the figure that both terrorism and its intensity increase 
military expenditure, though the latter respond with a lag to terrorism intensity. Furthermore, 
both these variables bring a permanent increase in military spending. Similarly, terrorist attacks 
and terrorism intensity affect each other positively. It is interesting to see the terrorist attacks 
reduce initially in response to increase in military spending. However, the impact turns positive 
within a year. Terrorism intensity, on the other hand, responds positively to higher defense 
budget. The reason may be that the insurgents responds with more deadly attacks (such as 
suicide bombings) when there is military operations financed by increased budgetary allocations. 
Overall, results show that unidirectional causal relationship is found running from terrorism 
intensity and terrorist attacks to military spending. The feedback hypothesis exists between 
terrorism intensity and terrorism attacks. 
  
These results combined with those present in Tables 6 and 7 raise two very important points that 
call for attention. The first point is regarding the causality running from terrorism and its 
intensity to military spending. It is obvious from the combined results that the intensity of 
terrorism has more psychological effects on the masses than the number of terrorist incidents 
and, therefore, becomes a convincing factor for high military spending. This result is in line with 
our hypothesis. As mentioned in the theoretical section, terrorist incidents without casualties 
have less effect on the people of Pakistan. They have become used to these incidents and, as a 
result, are less terrorized by them. The high frequency of terrorist attacks has become a daily 
matter for them. More importantly, such incidents are no more “Headline News” in print and 
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electronic media. Nevertheless, terrorist attack intensive in terms of high fatalities does spread 
terror in general public. The recent military operation in the Swat district of Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa is a good example of how terrorism intensity can raise military expenditure, as 
soon after the operation the military budget has been increased without any opposition.4 Since, 
the number of terrorist incidents and the intensity of terrorism have neither the same impact on, 
nor do they have the same meaning for the people anymore, ergo, one should be very careful in 
using these variables interchangeably in the models. 
Figure 1: Impulse Response Function 
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4In Swat, the terrorism intensity was extremely high not only because of high fatalities but also due to the type of 
terrorist attacks, including suicide bombings and beheading the people. Its intensity was felt even in Islamabad and 
therefore, when the operation was conducted in Swat, it was welcomed by the people. 
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  The second point is related to the absence of causality running from military spending to both 
terrorism and its intensity. It is worth mentioning that these results highlight the failure of 
enhanced military spending not only in controlling the terrorist attacks but also in curtailing their 
intensities. This failure in the latter case is even more worrying, pointing to the fact that the 
terrorists not only move around easily but have also been able to carry powerful explosives with 
them with the same ease. Subsequently, the conventional notion that terrorism can be eliminated 
or at least reduced through higher military spending is not an empirical fact in Pakistan. 
 
6. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
The prime objective of the underlying study was to investigate the causality between military 
spending, terrorism, and intensity of terrorism. Making use of ARDL approach to cointegration 
and the innovation accounting techniques for causality analysis, the study finds that terrorism 
intensity is more critical determinant, than terrorist attacks, of military spending.  Moreover, war 
on terror emerges as a major factor of increased budgetary allocations for defense. On the other 
hand, neither terrorism nor its intensity is influenced by military spending. In the following lines, 
we conclude the results and then make appropriate policy recommendations on basis of these 
results. 
 
 It is rightly said by Feridun and Shahbaz (2010) that military measures alone are not enough and 
there should be social, political and economic measures to fight against terrorism. However, 
these are long term solutions which basically originate from the literature on determinants of 
terrorism that calls for eradication of root causes of violence. It is, therefore, important to 
investigate the reasons responsible for the failure of military measures in curtailing terrorism. 
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Three points are very important in this regard. Firstly, the policy makers need to understand that 
military is trained specifically for the protection of boundaries from foreign invaders. 
Conversely, for internal security, civil agencies such as police and Federal Investigative Agency 
(FIA) are established. Moreover, in contrast to military personnel, the police is spread throughout 
the country and is an important source of law enforcement at the lowest possible level in the 
sense that an SHO in a particular area knows all the information about each household in that 
area. What is wrong with the current counter-terrorism policy is the extreme reliance on military 
measures to combat terrorism on one hand, and the negligence of the role of civil agencies on the 
other. Moreover, most of the terrorist attacks are originated and executed internally and the 
terrorist network exists throughout the country. Therefore, given the specific nature of terrorism 
and keeping in view the structural hierarchies of the law enforcement agencies in Pakistan, we 
believe that instead of looking to pure military measures and thereby allocating all the resources 
to them, concrete measures should be taken to strengthen the civil intelligence agencies. These 
should include training of the personnel, provision of advanced weapons as well as equipments 
for detection of explosive materials; and better coordination between the military, civil 
intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Given the resource constraint, this may not be an 
inappropriate policy to cut military budget to allocate funds to civil intelligence agencies to save 
their personnel from becoming easy victims of terrorist attacks as they are at the forefront in this 
war-on-terror. Seen in this perspective, the decision to increase military budget between 13%-
18% in this fiscal year in the name of war-on-terror should be carefully reviewed in the next 
budget discussions in the parliament. On the other side, the budgets of civil intelligence agencies 
should be increased substantially. 
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The second problem with this current counter-terrorism policy is the unequal provision of 
security. In Pakistan, few people including parliamentarians and even the high ranked military 
and civil officials are provided security at the cost of rest of the people. This has a 
counterproductive effect on security, as not enough personnel are available to inspect the various 
suspicious areas thereby providing easy hideouts for terrorists. As a result, a sense of insecurity 
prevails among the general public which has adverse psychological consequences like lowering 
the tolerance level in the society. So, these personnel should be released from the security of 
VIPs and should be used for inspections purposes. 
 
Lastly, the current measures for restriction of terrorists’ movements in the form of inserting 
cameras and making check posts at roads within the cities are not only inappropriate but also 
counter-productive. Capturing terrorists with explosive materials on these check posts, having 
not even a single vehicle-scanner, is insanity. Absence of scanners, even at the entrance points in 
important cities such as Islamabad, is worrisome. In contrast, these check posts, instead of 
providing security, create blockage on the roads and increase the probability of terrorist attacks 
in these congested areas. Such attacks have been observed in many cities including the Peshawar 
district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Hence, as a productive measure, these check posts should be 
equipped with advanced scanning facilities. 
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